

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GENEVA 01092 01 OF 03 251354Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-02 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00  
DODE-00 EA-10 EUR-12 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 IO-13  
L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02  
PA-01 PRS-01 DOE-11 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 NRC-05  
DOEE-00 SSO-00 /152 W  
-----003533 251416Z /42

P 251329Z JAN 78  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5093  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 01092

CW MESSAGE NO. 13

E.O. 22652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM UR US  
SUBJECT: US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS,  
ROUND SEVEN: FIFTH PLENARY MEETING, JANUARY 20, 1978

REF.: GENEVA 1081

1. SUMMARY: AT FIFTH PLENARY, JANUARY 20, US DEL MADE STRONG STATEMENT QUESTIONING REGRESSIONS IN SOVIET POSITION IN THE AREAS OF SCOPE AND VERIFICATION. US DEL ALSO CHALLENGED SOVIET SIDE FOR USING LANGUAGE WHICH US SIDE HAD REPEATEDLY SAID WAS UNCLEAR (E.G., "INCLUDING GOVERNMENTS OF STATES PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL") WITHOUT PROVIDING SUFFICIENT EXPLANATION. DEL ALSO STATED THAT US WILLINGNESS TO STUDY AND DISCUSS NEW SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION WAS NO INDICATION OF A CHANGE IN US POSITION THAT JOINT INITIATIVE SHOULD BE IN FORM OF AGREED KEY ELEMENTS RATHER THAN COMPLETE DRAFT CONVENTION. SOVIET DEL DEFERRED COMMENT ON SUBSTANCE OF US STATEMENT, BUT QUESTIONED US "REPROACH" OF SOVIET DEL  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GENEVA 01092 01 OF 03 251354Z

FOR NOT ADEQUATELY REFLECTING, IN SOVIET PRESENTATIONS OF JANUARY 16 AND 17, CHANGES IN US POSITION PRESENTED JANUARY 12. BRIEF REPORTS ON PROGRESS IN DRAFTING GROUP WERE PRESENTED BY ALTERNATE REPS OF BOTH DELS. END SUMMARY.

2. THE FIFTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS

ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) WAS HELD AFTERNOON JANUARY 20  
AT SOVIET MISSION.

3. AMBASSADOR V. I. LIKHACHEV (HEAD OF SOVIET DEL)  
ASKED FOR REPORT FROM DRAFTING GROUP. A.R.TURRENTINE  
(ALT. HEAD OF US DEL) REPORTED THAT THE DRAFTING GROUP  
HAD MET THREE TIMES AND THAT DISCUSSIONS HAD CENTERED  
CONFIDENTIAL

ON SCOPE, PARTICULARLY THE ISSUES OF IRRITANTS AND  
IMPORTANT PRECURSORS. ACTUAL DRAFTING ON AD REFERENDUM  
AGREED LANGUAGE, HE SAID, HAD NOT YET BEGUN THIS ROUND,  
BUT HE THOUGHT DRAFTING GROUP MIGHT BE READY TO BEGIN  
WORKING ON AD REFERENDUM LANGUAGE IN AREA OF SCOPE ONCE  
BOTH SIDES HAD COMPLETED DISCUSSIONS OF REMAINING  
QUESTIONS. B.P.KRASSULIN (ALT. HEAD OF SOVIET DEL)  
CHARACTERIZED ATMOSPHERE OF DRAFTING GROUP MEETINGS AS  
BUSINESSLIKE AND SAID THAT EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS  
ON THE QUESTION OF SCOPE PROVED THAT DIFFERENCES IN  
APPROACH STILL REMAINED. HE ADDED THAT SOVIET DEL BELIEVED  
THAT DRAFTING GROUP SHOULD CONCLUDE QUESTION/ANSWER  
STAGE OF ITS WORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND GET DOWN TO  
THE BUSINESS OF "FORMULATING THE PROVISIONS OF THE FUTURE  
CONVENTION," BEGINNING WITH THE SECTION ON SCOPE.

4. AMBASSADOR A.S. FISHER (HEAD OF US DEL) SAID THAT  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GENEVA 01092 01 OF 03 251354Z

IN STUDYING THE JANUARY 17 SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION, US  
DEL HAD NOTED LANGUAGE WHICH HAD BEEN INITIAL SOVIET  
PROPOSAL IN ROUND SIX. POINTING OUT THAT DIFFERENT  
LANGUAGE HAD BEEN AGREED TO AD REFERENDUM IN DRAFTING  
GROUP, FISHER QUESTIONED WHETHER AD REFERENDUM AGREED  
LANGUAGE STILL STOOD OR HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED BY LANGUAGE  
CONTAINED IN SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION. HE SAID, IN US  
VIEW, US-USSR UNDERSTANDING ON AD REFERENDUM AGREED  
LANGUAGE REMAINED IN FORCE. HE ADDED THAT US WILLINGNESS  
TO STUDY AND DISCUSS SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION SHOULD NOT  
BE UNDERSTOOD TO IMPLY ANY CHANGE IN US POSITION THAT  
JOINT INITIATIVE SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE CCD IN THE  
FORM OF AGREED KEY ELEMENTS. LIKHACHEV STATED THAT  
"WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OUR POSITION AS TO THE FORM OF THE  
JOINT INITIATIVE," THE PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED AGREEMENT  
FOR CONDUCT OF THE DRAFTING GROUP (I.E., DRAFTING AD  
REFERENDUM AGREED LANGUAGE) REMAINED IN FORCE.

5. FISHER PRESENTED EXTENSIVE STATEMENT QUESTIONING  
SOVIET DEL ON ROUND SEVEN POSITIONS WHICH APPEARED, TO  
US DEL, TO BE REGRESSIONS FROM SOVIET END OF ROUND SIX  
POSITIONS. SALIENT POINTS OF US PRESENTATION CONTAINED

PARAS 6 THRU 8 BELOW. FISHER NOTED PARTICULARLY THE  
AREAS OF SCOPE AND VERIFICATION. BEFORE CONCLUDING AGE HAD BEEN  
INCLUDED  
AGAIN WITHOUT CLARIFICATION. IF THE SOVIET DEL WAS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GENEVA 01092 02 OF 03 251403Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-02 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00  
DODE-00 EA-10 EUR-12 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 IO-13  
L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02  
PA-01 PRS-01 DOE-11 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 NRC-05  
DOEE-00 SSO-00 /152 W  
-----003680 251416Z /43

P 251329Z JAN 78  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5094  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 GENEVA 01092

CW MESSAGE NO. 13

PROPOSING THAT THE CONVENTION REQUIRE ADHERENCE OF ALL  
PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HE STATED,  
"WE CAN EXPECT POSTPONEMENT OF THE FRUITS OF OUR WORK FOR  
A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME -- PERHAPS INDEFINITELY."  
SOVIET DEL DID NOT OFFER CLARIFICATION OF THIS POINT  
DURING MEETING. FISHER ALSO REITERATED US VIEW THAT  
THERE SHOULD BE EXCHANGES OF GENERAL INFORMATION ON  
STOCKPILES, AT SIGNATURE. THESE WOULD NOT NEED TO BE  
PROVIDED FOR IN THE TREATY, BUT COULD BE ARRANGED ON A  
BILATERAL BASIS. HE STRESSED THE FACT THAT SUCH AN  
EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE US AND USSR WOULD BE A PREREQUISITE,  
IN HIS VIEW, FOR US TO OBTAIN RATIFICATION OF THE CON-  
VENTION.

6. SCOPE -- FISHER STATED THAT THE US SIDE HAD BELIEVED  
THAT BOTH DELS HAD AGREED IN ROUND SIX THAT QUANTITIES  
OF OTHERWISE PROHIBITED CHEMICALS TO BE PRODUCED OR  
DIVERTED FOR NONHOSTILE PURPOSES SHOULD BE LIMITED  
UNDER THE CONVENTION AND THAT EQUIPMENT FOR TROOP TRAIN-  
ING IN CHEMICAL DEFENSE WOULD BE SUCH AS TO PRECLUDE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GENEVA 01092 02 OF 03 251403Z

ANY POSSIBILITY OF OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE TRAINING. NOW, HOWEVER, IT APPEARED THAT THE SOVIET DEL WAS ADVOCATING COMPLETE FREEDOM FOR PARTIES TO DETERMINE UNILATERALLY MEANS OF CHEMICALS WARFARE TO BE RETAINED. HE STATED THAT, IN THE US VIEW, A CONVENTION BASED ON SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD NOT BE VIABLE.

7. VERIFICATION -- FISHER STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THE US WAS IN BASIC AGREEMENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF VERIFICATION PUT FORWARD BY THE SOVIET DEL DURING THE FOURTH PLENARY (SEE PARA 7, REF A), BUT ADDED THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION SEEMED TO EMPHASIZE THE SECOND PRINCIPLE (NON-INTERFERENCE) AT THE COST OF THE FIRST (VERIFICATION MUST ASSURE COMPLIANCE). HE POINTED OUT THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO AGREE THAT A REQUEST FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION SHOULD COME ONLY FROM A STATE PARTY AND THAT A CHALLENGED PARTY WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO REFUSE A REQUEST FOR ON-SITE VERIFICATION, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE OBLIGATED TO MAKE A REASONABLE EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE DOUBTS THAT LED TO THE CHALLENGE. HE STRESSED THAT THIS SHOULD BE A LEGAL OBLIGATION PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONVENTION, NOT MERELY A MATTER OF POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY. FISHER ALSO STATED THAT THE US PLACED GREAT IMPORTANCE ON REQUIRED VERIFICATION, UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES, OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF FACILITIES. HE ASKED HOW THE US-PROPOSED VERIFICATION SCHEME (INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION, AGREED TO IN ADVANCE IN THE CONVENTION, OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF FACILITIES, WITH EACH STATE PARTY DECLARING WHERE AND WHEN THEY ARE TO BE DESTROYED) COULD POSSIBLY CONTRAVENE THE SECOND VERIFICATION PRINCIPLE (PARA 7, REF A). FISHER POINTED OUT THAT THE US APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE WAS SIMILAR TO THE ON-SITE INSPECTION PROVISIONS OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GENEVA 01092 02 OF 03 251403Z

PNE TREATY.

8. FISHER SAID THAT THE REVISED SOVIET POSITION ON DECLARATION/DISPOSITION OF FACILITIES COMPOUNDED THE DIFFICULTIES OF VERIFICATION IN PROVIDING THAT ONLY FACILITIES DESIGNED OR USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PROHIBITED PRODUCTION WOULD BE SUBJECT TO ELIMINATION OR DISMANTLING; THE US SIDE VIEWED THIS POSITION AS CREATING A LOOPHOLE AND AS CONTRARY TO THE MUTUALLY AGREED PURPOSE OF THE CONVENTION. FURTHERMORE, HE POINTED OUT, THE SOVIET-

PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS WHERE ONLY THE CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY OF A FACILITY WOULD BE DISPOSED OF, WOULD REQUIRE EXTENSIVE ON-SITE VERIFICATION WHILE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF PROHIBITED FACILITIES, WHICH THE US PROPOSED, WOULD NOT. HE CONTINUED HIS CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET VERIFICATION PROPOSALS BY STATING THAT OMISSION OF THE SUPER-TOXIC TOXICITY THRESHOLD FROM THE SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION SEEMED TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE SOVIET "EXPRESSED WISH" TO AVOID "MAXIMIZING VERIFICATION". HE POINTED OUT THAT THIS THRESHOLD SIMPLIFIED MANY VERIFICATION PROCEDURES BY COUPLING THE DEGREE OF VERIFICATION WITH THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE ACTIVITY; AND SAID THAT THE US, IN PROVIDING FOR SUCH A THRESHOLD, HAD SOUGHT TO ISOLATE THAT AREA REQUIRING PARTICULAR ATTENTION WITH RESPECT TO VERIFICATION AND, THEREBY, AVOID UNNECESSARY, EXTENSIVE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR AREAS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE.

9. LIKHACHEV SAID THAT HE WOULD DEFER COMMENTING ON SUBSTANCE OF US STATEMENT UNTIL SOVIET DEL HAD STUDIED ITS CONTENT. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT MOST OF THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE US DEL HAD

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GENEVA 01092 03 OF 03 251403Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-02 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00  
DODE-00 EA-10 EUR-12 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 IO-13  
L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02  
PA-01 PRS-01 DOE-11 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 NRC-05  
DOEE-00 SSO-00 /152 W

-----003696 251416Z /42

P 251329Z JAN 78

FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5095  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 GENEVA 01092

CW MESSAGE NO. 13

ALREADY BEEN ANSWERED BY THE SOVIET DEL IN THE COURSE OF ITS EARLIER PRESENTATIONS. HE TOOK EXCEPTION TO WHAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS A US "REPROACH" FOR NOT REFLECTING REVISED US POSITIONS IN SOVIET PRESENTATIONS ON

JANUARY 16 AND 17, CONFIRMING US DEL VIEW THAT SOVIET STATEMENTS HAD BEEN PREPARED IN MOSCOW PRIOR TO BEGINNING OF ROUND SEVEN. FISHER RESPONDED THAT HE HAD NOT INTENDED HIS REMARKS BE TAKEN AS A "REPROACH", "QUESTION? YES. CRITICISM? PERHAPS. BUT, REPROACH? NEVER". LIKHACHEV CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS BY CALLING FOR PROMPT CONCLUSION OF QUESTION/ANSWER SESSIONS AND INITIATION OF ACTUAL DRAFTING, SPECIFICALLY IN THE AREA OF SCOPE.

10. THE NEXT PLENARY MEETING WILL BE AFTERNOON OF JANUARY 25. NEXT MEETING OF THE DRAFTING GROUP WILL BE HELD AFTERNOON OF JANUARY 24. VANDEN HEUVEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** CHEMICAL WARFARE, NEGOTIATIONS, CHEMICALS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 25 jan 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978GENEVA01092  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780037-0338  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** GENEVA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780125/aaaaavbw.tel  
**Line Count:** 289  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 9ad1a1e0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 78 GENEVA 1081  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 18 apr 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3718558  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ROUND SEVEN: FIFTH PLENARY MEETING, JANUARY 20, 1978  
**TAGS:** PARM, PCAT, US, UR  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/9ad1a1e0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014